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Soldiering as an obstacle to manhood? Masculinities and ex-combatants 
in Burundi 
The image of the warrior as the ultimate symbol of manhood is familiar across 
cultures and countries. There is a large quantity of research that demonstrates the 
connection between militarism and masculinity, and militarized masculinities have 
been argued to be the hegemonic form of masculinity, particularly in conflict-
affected areas. Recently however there has been a calling for the rethinking of the 
connection between masculinity and violence. In this article, I explore the 
construction of masculinities among ex-combatants in Burundi. Based on 
participant observation, eighteen individual interviews and four focus group 
discussions, I argue that having served in an armed group has not had a significant 
impact on the masculinity ideas of my interlocutors. There is a weak connection 
between ideas of what makes a good soldier on the one hand and manhood in 
civilian life on the other. Marriage, fatherhood and being the provider are the most 
important factors in masculinity construction in Burundi. These all require 
economic capital. In addition, socio-economic status is important for the power 
and respect that it brings. The focus on socio-economic status as the locus of 
masculinity construction also applies to ex-combatants, but many of them are 
struggling to adhere to it. My interlocutors presented their time spent in the armed 
group as a time wasted that would otherwise have been used on education or 
starting a career, in other words on the pursuit to achieving manhood. The 
narrative given was thus of soldiering not being an avenue, but an obstacle, to 
manhood. 
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Introduction 
In a dusty field in the Burundian town of Maramvya a young man named Claude 
watches over the village's goats. A former lieutenant to Hutu chiefs in the aftermath 
of a civil war that ended in 2005, he still has the strong build of a fighter. But now he 
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wears tattered pants and women's sandals with a dirty plastic jewel at the toe: a 
soldier with none of the power he once commanded (Wilson, 2011). 
 
The above excerpt is the beginning of an article from the Guardian, written in 2011. It 
portrays a familiar image of an ex-combatant, someone that used to possess, but has now 
lost, strength and power. Judging from the extract, Claude seems also to have lost his 
masculinity, demonstrated by directing the reader’s gaze towards his sandals that 
assumedly the journalist defines as women’s sandals. Whether this is Claude’s view is 
not clear.   
Since the 1980s research on the relationship (or the lack thereof) between 
masculinity/men and femininity/women on the one hand and violence and armed conflict 
on the other has become more prominent (Cohn, 1987; Elshtain, 1987; Enloe, 1989; 
Ruddick, 1983; Swerdlow, 1982). The connection between masculinity and violence has 
since then gained increased attention within academia (Kirby & Henry, 2012), both 
within the feminist section of International Relation and within Masculinity Studies 
(e.g.Connell 2002; Enloe 2000; Hooper 2001; Zalewski and Parpart 1998). 
Much of the work focuses on violence and combat as important, if not essential, 
in forming influential ideas of masculinity, including that of hegemonic masculinity. It is 
hence assumed that men with experience of combat would have aggressive, violent and 
militarized ideas of masculinity and attempt to conform to them. Theorizing on the extent 
of militarization of combatants’ lives often holds this to be the case (Clarke, 2008; Daley, 
2008; Dolan, 2003; Goldstein, 2001; Hinojosa, 2010; Morgan, 1994; Nye, 2007; Porter, 
2013; Theidon, 2009).  
However, there is also extensive literature that points to the diversity of 
masculinities constructed in relations to militaries and combat (Bulmer, 2013; Higate, 
2003; Myrttinen, Khattab, & Naujoks, 2017; Sasson-Levy, 2003; Titunik, 2008). This 
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literature points to the many different, and sometimes conflicting notions of masculinities 
that can be connected to militaries and military-like institutions. These, often very large, 
institution thus do not construct simplistic, one-dimensional notions of masculinity, nor 
are they working in complete isolation from their surroundings. In addition, literature 
calling for the rethinking of the connection between masculinity and violence has 
emerged (Dietrich Ortega, 2012; Duncanson, 2015; Kirby & Henry, 2012; Parpart, 
2015). This article builds on the above literature but goes one step further in not only 
problematizing the relationship between military experience and masculinity but arguing 
that in the case of Burundi there seems to be a negative relationship between the two. Not 
only is masculinity construction not based on military experience or ideas but there 
seems to be a somewhat negative relationship between the two since a number of my 
interlocutors claim that the time spent fighting in the civil war is the reason they struggle 
to adhere to notions of masculinity today.  
There are a number of other aspects than militarization that affect and are 
important for masculinity construction, for combatants and non-combatants alike. One 
aspect is that of socio-economic status and man as the provider. This seems to remain a 
strong feature of masculinity construction in societies across the globe. Men are viewed 
as the breadwinners of their families, and failure in providing for your family converts to 
failure in manhood. 
This article forms part of a larger research project on the reintegration of ex-
combatants in Burundi. The focus of this particular paper is to address the masculinity 
ideas of these ex-combatants, given their experience of having been active participants in 
armed groups. Although a few women were interviewed the focus is on ex-combatants 
that identify as male and therefore how they make sense of their manhood and the 
expectations they meet as biological men. Although I by no means disagree with the 
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understanding of masculinity as something not confined to men rather than women, but 
indeed something that both women and men can adhere to, the focus here is on men and 
the expectations they and others have to them, as men. Militarized masculinities are 
contextual and have not been researched in Burundi until now. This paper considers what 
military ideas are important in Burundi, as well as what notions of masculinity are 
prominent among Burundian ex-combatants. I find that socio-economic status weighs 
more heavily in the masculinity construction of my interlocutors than military ideas do. 
Ex-combatants are not different to other Burundians in this regard, and they adhere to the 
same values and norms as their non-ex-combatant fellow Burundians. 
I begin the article by discussing theories of masculinities and how these relate to 
ex-combatants. After providing a brief background of the Burundi context I then 
introduce my methodology. From there, I move to a discussion on what military ideas are 
considered important in Burundi, how these do not seem to be linked with manhood ideas 
of Burundian ex-combatants, and finally how socio-economic status seems to be the 
dominant notion of masculinity construction in Burundi.  
 
Theories of masculinities 
An important aspect of masculinity research is the acknowledgement of its plurality; 
there is always a multitude of forms of masculinity at play in every society (Connell, 
1995). These differing forms of masculinity however relate to each other in dominance 
and subordination (Connell, 1995, p. 37), hence, although there are competing aspects of 
masculinities at play, they vary in their dominance in a given culture. 
How masculinity is formed within armed forces and how this affects the whole 
gender order in wider society has been of interest to many scholars. It has been claimed 
that the image of the warrior is the strongest symbol of men and masculinity (Morgan, 
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1994, p. 165) and that being both a civilian and a man can be nearly impossible in times 
of conflict (Dolan, 2003; Nye, 2007). In American and European culture, and in conflict 
affected areas, militarized masculinity has been seen as the hegemonic form of 
masculinity, the most powerful one that overrides other forms of masculinity (Connell, 
1995; Myrttinen et al., 2017). To explain this, the idea is put forward that war is a horrific 
scene that no one would willingly want to join, and stay in, unless offered something 
instead. Manhood is what is offered to those that make this choice (Goldstein, 2001, p. 
253). Goldstein’s theory is that to have men ready to fight, kill, and potentially die for 
their country, cultures must develop concepts of masculinity that motivate men to fight. 
Therefore, militarized masculinities affect all men, also those outside military structures 
(Barrett, 1996).  
There is however recent research and theorising that questions the hegemony of 
militarized masculinity and calls for a more nuanced investigation of the concept 
(Bulmer & Eichler, 2017; Myrttinen et al., 2017; Zalewski, 2017). Eriksson Baaz and 
Stern (2008) have conducted research with Congolese soldiers and found that although 
some soldiers expressed their ideas of manhood in terms of strength and courage, there 
were a number of other competing views of masculinity among the soldiers interviewed. 
Amongst the male soldiers, the description of a successful soldier was an educated 
soldier with a desk job rather than a brave, strong, frontline fighting soldier. Similarly, 
Dietrich Ortega’s (2012) research with former insurgent militants in Peru, Colombia and 
El Salvador demonstrates that the masculinities constructed within the groups offered 
comradeship between men and women and went beyond the predominant association of 
men with violence. Bulmer and Eichler (2017, p. 175) maintain that to understand the 
lived realities of ex-combatants, researchers should avoid putting them in pre-fabricated 
boxes such as that of a militarized masculinity, and Myrttinen, Khattab and Naujoks 
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(2017, p. 108) further warn against the conflation of hegemony, masculinity, violence 
and soldiers/militias, pointing towards the various analytical problems that accompany 
this.  
 A different construction of masculinity, but common, is one that is more closely 
related to economic capital. Besides being expected to be security providers, men are also 
expected to be providers of economic resources. This model of the male breadwinner in 
the global north is argued to go back to nineteenth century ideas of gendered spaces 
brought on by the industrial revolution (Coltrane & Adams, 2005; Creighton, 1996) 
establishing the dichotomy of the ‘breadwinner’ and the ‘dependent’(Pateman, 2006, pp. 
135–136). The idea of masculinity based on being a provider is also documented to be 
strong in many locations outside the global north, including in countries in the Caribbean 
(Chevannes, 2006), Latin America (Olavarría, 2006), and Sub-Saharan Africa (Barker & 
Ricardo, 2005). The relationship between masculinity and economic means remains 
strong globally and Connell (1998) has offered transnational business masculinities as 
the hegemonic form of masculinities globally.     
 The model of men as the breadwinners and women as the carers was to some 
extent imported into former colonies by their colonizers (Hunt, 1990; Lindsay, 1999) 
although the linking of economic capital and manhood was far from being foreign. 
However, what many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have in common, distinguishing 
them somewhat from their former colonizers today is the central importance of marriage 
as an identity construction factor, and the economic capital needed for the marriage to 
take place (Amuyunzu-Nyamongo & Francis, 2006; Dolan, 2003; Groes-Green, 2009; 
Matlon, 2015; Sommers & Uvin, 2011; Utas, 2005b). In many countries, providing the 
funds needed for the bride-price, as well as for the marriage ceremony and household for 
the newlyweds, is becoming nearly impossible for men of lower socio-economic status. 
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In reaction to this, informal unions or cohabitations have become more common 
(Amuyunzu-Nyamongo & Francis, 2006; Silberschmidt, 2004; Sommers & Uvin, 2011). 
Not being able to legally marry leads to these men being stuck in the social category of 
youth, or as phrased by Utas (2005b, 150), as ‘youthmen’. 
The lack of flexibility in attaining manhood, or men’s inability to adapt to new 
ideas of masculinity, has at times been blamed for men’s violence (Amuyunzu-
Nyamongo & Francis, 2006; Dolan, 2003), or even for armed conflict (Barker & Ricardo, 
2005; Richards, 2005). Richards (2005), referring to the civil war in Sierra Leone, states 
that the inability to marry was sometimes a motivation factor in men’s decision to join 
the war and that some men joined the factions in order to accrue the finances needed to 
marry. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) kidnapped women to be given as ‘wives’ 
to the RUF male fighters (Richards, 2005, p. 204), thus exploiting this common problem 
of the inability to marry and consequently achieving manhood. Utas (2005b, pp. 140–
141), writing on combatants in the Liberian civil war, similarly claims it possible that the 
likelihood of remaining unmarried may have served as an important reason for men 
choosing to join rebel forces. The Liberian civil war gave combatants the opportunity to 
secure a large number of ‘wives’/girlfriends, something that had previously been 
impossible and was a sign of newfound status and power (Utas, 2005a, pp. 69–70). 
 
Burundi’s civil war and its aftermath 
Burundi has been troubled with violence and civil unrest since independence from 
Belgium in 1962. Coups were the usual mode of change of government in the twentieth 
century when Tutsi from the same region took turns in ousting each other. At the same 
time acts of genocide occurred on a regular basis, often started as Hutu rebellions against 
oppression, only to be quelled, and disproportionally avenged, by a Tutsi military (Uvin, 
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2009, p. 9). Following the assassination of Burundi’s first democratically elected 
President, Melchior Ndadaye, in 1993, a civil war broke out. The war formally ended in 
2005 with the swearing in of a new President, Pierre Nkurunziza (Reyntjens, 2006, p. 
129).  
The hostilities were followed by several talks on cease-fires and power sharing 
modalities and in the year 2000 the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (Arusha 
Accord) was signed. In the Arusha Accord provisions are made for a Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Program. The program was set up to disarm, 
demobilize and reintegrate up to 55,000 ex-combatants into civilian life, based on the 
estimate that there were 60,000 ex-combatants in the country (World Bank, 2010, p. 59). 
By its completion in 2008 just over 26,000 ex-combatants had been demobilized (World 
Bank, 2010, p. 24).  
Ex-combatants face various challenges in Burundi. One of the main challenges to 
the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants is the immense poverty in the country. This 
is partly related to high population density and hence the lack of land, but also due to 
other factors exacerbated by the civil war, lack and destruction of infrastructure, rising 
malnutrition and disease such as HIV/AIDS, and fall in school enrolment and food 
production. Burundi’s poverty, which certainly existed prior to the war, has grown even 
deeper due to cutbacks in social services, shrinkage of government revenues and bigger 
proportions of expenditures going towards the military. It is therefore a tough 
environment that ex-combatants are expected to integrate into (Lemarchand, 2009, p. 
163). 
Optimism was in the air following the 2005 elections (Peterson, 2006) but 
unfortunately did not last long. The Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie - 
Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), the biggest rebel group during 
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the war, now the political ruling party, won the elections in 2005. The party also won the 
municipal elections in 2010 and the opposition claiming election fraud boycotted the 
legislative and presidential elections of 2010. This boycott only strengthened the CNDD-
FDD’s power hold. Tension rose in 2014 preceding the 2015 elections and when it was 
announced on April 25 2015 that Nkurunziza would be the CNDD-FDD’s presidential 
candidate for his third term, protests broke out (Reyntjens, 2016). Two weeks into the 
protests, on the 13th of May, a coup attempt was made, but failed. Grenade attacks and 
shootings at night continued to be the norm in Bujumbura however, in particular in 
specific areas considered to be opposition strongholds. 
  
Methodology 
This research took place in Burundi from January until December 2015. The participants 
were individuals, mainly men, that took part in Burundi’s civil war, either with the state 
army at the time; Forces Armées du Burundi (FAB), or with one of the two biggest rebel 
groups; CNDD-FDD or Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL). The main data of the 
research comes from participant observation. In addition, complementary 18 individual 
interviews and four focus group discussions were conducted. It quickly became apparent 
that the interviews and focus group discussions were only giving a superficial idea of 
what masculinity meant to the men spoken to. As may be expected when researching 
something as fluid and intangible as gender identity, it was not very common for people 
to explain their behaviour or views concretely. The many different factors that come 
together to construct ideas of masculinity in Burundi had thus to be interpreted from 
observed behaviour and other stated views. I conducted individual interviews with three 
women, but apart from that all interlocutors where men.  
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The first point of entry was a local civil society organisation (CSO) which had 
conducted work with ex-combatants and had several staff members that were themselves 
ex-combatants. This CSO provided assistance by identifying ex-combatants to interview 
as well as providing translation services for interviews with those that did not speak 
French or English. The main assistance received from the CSO however was to allow me 
to sit in the office and become part of the social network the office and its employees and 
affiliates provided, very often just referred to as the ‘family’. As I was in daily contact 
with people at the office and several of the employees were ex-combatants, many of them 
became some of the main interlocutors of the research. To protect their anonymity I 
choose not to identify the CSO, and all names in this article are pseudonyms. 
As fieldwork progressed I used my network in Burundi to contact ex-combatants 
that were not affiliated with this CSO, to limit somewhat its power and influence on the 
research. Interviews were conducted with participants from the former FNL group living 
at the outskirts of Bujumbura and with former state military soldiers. The former state 
military soldiers also became some of the main interlocutors of the research with regular 
meet-ups following the interviews. 
Given that my Kirundi speaking abilities remained limited throughout the period 
of fieldwork the main interlocutors are all men that speak French or English. This means 
that the poorest, worst off ex-combatants are not represented, except through the 
interviews. It also means that data gathered through observation of how the men reacted 
and communicated with each other was limited. The bulk of the data was collected in 
individual conversations with the interlocutors. Sometimes these conversations were 
completely unstructured, as those among friends where relevant topics would come up by 
coincidence. Other times these conversations were more structured when I had a specific 
topic in mind that I wanted to discuss in more detail. The findings are based on data that 
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comes from these conversations, participant observation in general, as well as the 
interviews and focus group discussions. 
 
Militarized masculinities in Burundi 
What a militarized notion of masculinity may look like is contested as both masculinity 
and militarism are contextual and can be defined in various ways. Aaron Belkin points 
out that militarized masculinity varies across time and space, but offers the definition of 
it as ‘a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that can enable individuals – men and 
women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or 
with military ideas’ (Belkin, 2012, p. 3). Belkin brings up the important point that 
militarized masculinity is not necessarily confined to those that identify as men. This 
research however focused on men, and the pressure and expectations they are met with as 
biological men. Using Belkin’s definition of claiming authority on the basis of 
affirmative relationships with the military, the conclusion would be that the masculinity 
ideas of my interlocutors were in no way militarized. The reason for this however is the 
stigma that ex-combatants in Burundi are faced with and that there are few occasions 
when associating yourself with active participation in the civil war is beneficial for them. 
This leaves us with ‘military ideas’.  
Given that militarized masculinities are multiple and contextual it is worth firstly 
exploring the narratives given by my interlocutors on soldiering to perceive of what 
military ideas may have been considered important in Burundi. Secondly, it is worth 
exploring in what way the ideas portrayed as important for soldiering are considered 
important and/or related to manhood in the post-combat life. It is worth noting that as I 
am a foreign, white woman what my interlocutors chose to portray and not to portray is 
likely to be somewhat influenced by my position. It is probable that some would be 
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hesitant to portray themselves as violent for example. In some instances, however, it was 
interesting to note the willingness in which many of my interlocutors were ready to share 
their vulnerabilities. 
When discussing combatants, and what characterized good combatants, the by far 
most common answer centred around obedience. As was mentioned by one participant in 
one of the focus group discussion: ‘Combatants are people that respect orders. They 
obey. They never say no.’ These sentiments were echoed in many other interviews and 
conversations and were by far the most common attributes mentioned regarding what 
makes a successful soldier. This is in line with what has been documented elsewhere, 
such as in the DRC (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2008, pp. 72–75). Interestingly, this was 
also often mentioned as a reason why many of my interlocutors had not been interested in 
continuing a career in the military at the end of the civil war but opted for 
demobilization. Pierre, a former state military soldier, spoke about the relief of becoming 
a civilian again after demobilization 
Normally, civilians are, I wouldn’t really say that they are free, but they are 
responsible for their own life. But us soldiers, when we wanted to go out, 
there was a form to fill, you have to ask for permission etc….in the army it is 
difficult to make decisions for yourself because we were trained in a way that 
there is always a person passing on orders, all you have to do is wait for 
decisions coming from above. 
Elise, a former FNL combatant, also spoke of this lack of freedom as the reason for 
choosing to demobilize, she had chosen freedom rather than military life. Even though 
obedience and discipline came up very strongly as the most important attribute that 
defines a good combatant, this was not something that seemed to be highly valued in 
civilian life after the combatant days. 
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The second most common attribute that came up when discussing good 
combatants was that of being fearless/courageous. This was usually put forward as a 
simple matter of fact as Jean-Claude did: ‘[We were taught] to not be afraid of dying 
because dying can be a consequence of what we do’. How much fearlessness was valued 
in the aftermath of the war varied between individuals and situations. There was 
somewhat of a difference between those that were or had taken part in the popular 
protests taking place in 2015 and those that did not. This is perhaps not a surprise given 
that the active protesters were again in a situation where their life was on the line and 
they needed to face these fears. Others were much less concerned about hiding their fear 
about the escalating security situation. I learnt that perhaps my ideas of masculinity were 
more militarized than those of my informants when catching myself being surprised and 
somewhat concerned, the first time an interlocutor admitted openly his fear to me due to 
the escalating security situation.  
In line with the messiness that relates to masculinity construction and how men 
choose to portray themselves in this regard, Didier had contradicting ways of expressing 
his fear or fearlessness. In a conversation he stated that ‘military life taught me to be 
fearless. If something happens, I am not like other civilians…they [the police] shoot and 
I don’t fear’ only a couple of minutes later he said: ‘I am scared because they [the 
government] ordered to kill. Not even arrest people, but kill them’. Didier thus jumped 
between portraying himself as fearless to admitting fear. Although there were certainly 
instances when my interlocutors stressed their fearlessness and sometimes related it to 
the fact that they had been active participants in the civil war, this was by no means the 
only portrayal they depicted of themselves and being afraid was not necessarily hidden 
from me, as one might expect if the values from soldiering days were still being thought 
to be important in identity construction. 
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Finally, the third most common explanation of what made a good combatant was 
perhaps the most unconventional. This was essentially to be a ‘good people person’. The 
importance of being a good comrade in a military setting is not new. Claude explained 
this importance nicely ‘We all came from different backgrounds and sometimes didn’t 
get along, but when we were under threat we had to fight together for the sake of security 
and protection and our strength was to stay together.’ Clearly, it was vital for survival to 
stay together in combat. Others however, pointed out to the need to be fair when sharing 
provisions, to get along with everyone, knowing how to manage a group and respect and 
assist others. This emphasis on being a good people person, helpful and respectful, also 
carried over to relations with civilians. The focus on not making use of your position as a 
combatant and maltreat civilians came up frequently but also the need to work well with 
civilians as stated by Alain, a former CNDD-FDD combatant: 
…also, when we’re on the battlefield, we really need to communicate with the 
population, to collaborate with the community. A good soldier is also 
someone who knows how to approach people, to exchange, to cooperate, 
because sometimes we really need information from the population to know if 
there were plans to attack us, to know if tomorrow we were going to be 
attacked and know which way to go.   
Pascal also explained this at a different occasion saying that the civilians of the area were 
the most important resource for an armed group, and vital for their success. This focus on 
people skills as important for combatants is also known within the western military 
counterinsurgency doctrine, where focus is now on living with local communities and 
‘winning hearts and minds’. Something that according to Kilcullen (2006, p. 31), is all 
about establishing trusted networks. Counterinsurgency has been presented as the soft, 
feminized option as opposed to military tactics focused on destroying the enemy with 
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more mechanized warfare (Khalili, 2011). My interlocutors do however not seem to 
make any such distinction. People skills were considered vital to complement aggressive 
types of warfare and defence, not as opposite strategies. 
This, perhaps unconventional, attribute of what makes a good combatant was, as 
opposed to obedience and fearlessness, something that was still highly valued in civilian 
life in the aftermath of the civil war. When discussing reintegration, it was frequently 
emphasised that this was successful when the ex-combatant him or herself was good at 
reaching out to his or her neighbours, portraying that they had good intentions and being 
a visible and active community member. In addition, this was also what frequently came 
up when discussing what men are supposed to be like in Burundi. Jean-Claude 
summarized it thus: ‘A good civilian man is the one who lives in harmony with others, 
who is patient, respectful, not short tempered and who always looks for ways of 
strengthening relationships with his neighbours.’ 
These attributes are thus both linked to military and civilian life. People skills are 
of importance for creating employment and business opportunities and what makes a 
good entrepreneur, thus closely linked to masculinity construction as the breadwinner, 
which will be discussed in further detail below. This indicates again that there is not a 
clear-cut differentiation between diverse versions of masculinity. Indeed, they mix and 
overlap in various different manners.  
 
Soldiering an obstacle to manhood? 
The sentiments towards the time spent in the armed group were also an example of 
ambiguousness. My interlocutors rarely spoke of longing for or missing their time as 
combatants, as has been reported elsewhere (e.g Utas 2004, 212). There were however 
instances when positive relations with the armed group were expressed. During a focus 
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group discussion with former FNL soldiers for example the whole group started laughing 
when asked whether they missed the power that having a gun gave them. The answer 
seemed obvious, no one objected to the idea that having a gun, and the power that 
accompanied it, was a good feeling they didn’t mind having. Yet, when asked whether 
that life was something they would want to go back to they all became more serious and 
held that this was not something they would want to consider. One of them stated that: 
The reason why we can’t go back is that we decided to go back to civil life, 
which means we wanted to live a normal life, with a family, just like normal 
people, because our experience in the military was not always pleasant.  
It was more common to hear bitter accounts of the time these men spent actively taking 
part in the war. Their experience was usually quite different to what they had expected 
when joining and stories of hunger, hardship, death and grief were the usual answer to 
questions of how they viewed their time as combatants. Felix was particularly clear on 
his disassociation with anything to do with military life, ‘I really hate guns now. When I 
see a civilian with a gun I report it immediately to the authorities… I cannot even buy 
camouflage clothes’ he stated.  
In fact, having had experience of combat had few positive connotations. On the 
contrary, it was portrayed as an obstacle to achieving manhood. Joseph was one of the 
more disadvantaged participants in this research. Putting food on the table for his wife 
and children was a daily struggle for him as he did not have a steady income. He 
described the state of ex-combatants as an in-between state, not soldiers but not full 
civilians either ‘…the problem is that we are going through a lot of poverty, we are 
neither civilians nor soldiers…’. When probed about what this meant, the answer went 
back to poverty and the meaning he seemed to be putting into the term civilian was more 
than just someone that was not a soldier. It was someone that was economically 
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independent and lived a dignified life. Joseph blamed his time in the armed struggle for 
why his life was not successful today. When asked what he thought his life, and that of 
the other men in the focus group, would have been like if they had not participated in the 
war he answered: ‘We would be rich, would have gone to school and would have 
completed studies already; we would be strong business men.’ This is perhaps not a 
realistic assumption, given the number of poor, uneducated and unemployed people in 
Burundi today, most of whom are not ex-combatants. The point is that Joseph, similarly 
to other interlocutors, never spoke fondly of the time in the armed group and never 
presented it as a time when he had an opportunity to conform to ideals of masculinity. On 
the contrary, given how socio-economic status is vital for the construction of masculinity 
in Burundi he presented this time as an obstacle for him reaching manhood. 
This is similar to what others have concluded in Burundi. It has been previously 
concluded that firstly, attraction to military life was not considered important in the 
decision making of taking part in the Burundi civil war (Uvin, 2007, p. 4). Secondly, that 
armed groups in Burundi seem to have been unsuccessful in forming a dominant male 
identity based on being a member of these groups (Seckinelgin, 2012), if that was ever on 
their agenda. This research corroborates these previous findings but goes further. There is 
not only not a strong positive link between military ideas and experience on the one hand 
and ideas of masculinity on the other. In addition, there is a negative relationship 
between military experience and masculinity.  
 Masculinity only exists in relation to femininity and militarized masculinity is 
frequently constructed in opposition to a weaker or less respected ‘other’, women or 
civilians for example (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2008, p. 67; Holyfield, Cobb, Herford, & 
Ogle, 2017). View towards women as combatants was the only matter where there was a 
clear difference between former rebels, who had fought alongside women, and former 
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state military soldiers, who had not. It was only the former state military soldiers that 
expressed doubts of women’s combat capacity. All the interlocutors that had fought with 
the rebel groups had fought with female combatants. They were all clear about their view 
that women made just as good soldiers as men. When probed about a possible difference 
in physical strength they either said that women could train to be as good as men or, 
more commonly, dismissed physical strength as being important for a competent soldier. 
In other words, they did not seem to relate combat capacity to being a man. 
Gloria is an ex-combatant who used to fight with the FNL. She was taking active 
part in the popular protests against President Nkurunziza, which had been on-going for 
two months, when I met her in June 2015. She did confirm what many of the male ex-
combatants had already said, that she, as a woman, had not been treated differently than 
men within the armed group and that the men that she commanded had never shown her 
anything but respect. ‘… They had to respect me because I was chosen by respected 
men’ Gloria stated, pointing towards the hierarchy of the armed group as the reason why 
her authority was not questioned. Gloria was at this point in time however not only active 
in the on-going protests but taking on a leadership role in them. ‘They have chosen me 
because I am a courageous woman and fearless’ Gloria explained, using quite militaristic 
terms in explaining her leadership role in the protests. Since the end of the war Gloria has 
gotten married and had children. Contrary to the leadership role that she had been trusted 
with both within FNL and with the protest organization, her household is a conventional 
Burundian household, where her husband makes the decisions. Gloria didn’t seem to 
want to dwell too much on this fact. She said that she was content with the fact that her 
husband was the one making the decisions, except when she disagreed with the decisions 
made. Gloria seems to have been able to climb the ladder both within the rebel group and 
within the organization of the protests without it threatening the masculinity of her fellow 
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rebel soldiers or protesters. Within the home there is a different story however. The 
dominance of the man seems very much still to be the norm and not to be challenged. 
This is in line with the accounts from male interlocutors, men that allegedly had no 
problems fighting alongside women or taking orders from them on the battlefield but 
made it clear to me that within their homes they were the ones in charge. Rigid ideas of 
masculinity seem to be stronger within the household than within rebel groups as the 
household is the locus of masculinity construction. 
   
Being a man in Burundi 
‘Of course I have many different sources of income. I am a man. A man needs to have 
four different sources of income, just like a table needs four legs and a car four wheels’. 
This is the reply I got from a Burundian civilian when I commented on his several, and 
very different, types of sources of income. It indicates quite clearly the importance of 
income in masculinity construction in Burundi. When asked about what makes a good 
man or a real man, socio-economic status rarely came up in the interviews. Yet, 
participant observation suggests that this might in fact be the most important factor in 
masculinity construction in Burundi. Social status is evidently linked with wealth, being 
unemployed is not only difficult due to the lack of finances and the hardships that follow, 
but also because of the shame of it, as came up in many conversations with my 
interlocutors. 
The clearest indicator of manhood in Burundi however is marriage. What 
differentiates umuhungu (boy), and umugabo (man) is marital status rather than age. 
Marriage is the milestone needed to reach to achieve manhood or womanhood 
(Berkmoes & White, 2014, p. 199; Sommers, 2013; Uvin, 2009, p. 125) and men should 
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ideally build a house as well as pay the bride-price before they marry (Sommers, 2013, p. 
30; Uvin, 2009, p. 125). 
One of my interlocutors, Claude, got married whilst I was in Burundi and I was 
able to share this important day with him. The next time I saw him I asked him how he 
was doing as a married man, whether he was a different person with a different life now. 
‘Yes, now I am a man’ Claude exclaimed with a broad smile and hands in the air in a 
celebratory fashion. Claude was 45 years old at that time. Obviously, age, not to mention 
a 12-year career in the military, had not been enough to give him that much longed-for 
manhood that he had now finally obtained. 
Getting married in Burundi however, as in many other places where bride-price is 
in place, is easier said than done and is far from being simply an exercise of finding a 
suitable companion. As previously mentioned, this can be incredibly expensive. Given 
the importance of marriage it can therefore be argued that in Burundi, men need to have 
economic means to reach manhood. Not all my interlocutors were as successful as 
Claude. Claude did not marry until the age of 45, but many others did not foresee being 
able to marry at all in their lifetime. Many of my interlocutors spoke of this with 
frustration and sadness. The financial difficulties with getting married lead to what they 
called illegal marriages, informal marriages where the bride-price has not been paid.  
Informal marriages are common in Burundi (Berkmoes & White, 2014, p. 198). 
In a comparative research between Burundi and Rwanda, Sommers and Uvin (2011) 
argue that Burundi allows for more flexibility in straying away from normative 
masculinity. Young people live together in informal marriages rather than remaining 
single in their parents’ houses, and when there are not enough funds to build a separate 
house, an extra room is sometimes simply added to the house of the man’s parents. 
Berkmoes and White (2014, 198) argue however that even though informal marriages are 
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common, they are not approved of. These solutions are also not sanctioned by the 
government as became clear in May 2017 when the Burundi government ordered couples 
to legalize their marriages before the end of the year of 2017 (‘Burundi presses unwed 
couples to marry’, 2017). 
This is in line with the narratives provided by my interlocutors. Those that were 
living in these illegal marriages expressed this as being shameful. ‘As I said before, 
respect from the community starts in your family [depends on your performance within 
your household]. People cannot respect you if your marriage is illegal’ one interlocutor 
stated. 
Men are also expected to provide for their family (Sommers, 2013, p. 30; Turner, 
1999; Uvin, 2009, p. 132), including children born outside marriage (Uvin, 2009, p. 128) 
; another indicator of manhood clearly being related to socio-economic status. Being a 
good provider had for one interlocutor, Henri, helped win over the part of his wife’s 
family that had originally not given their blessing for their marriage. Henri and his wife 
were of different ethnic backgrounds and this had been seen as problematic by some of 
his wife’s relatives. Now, around 18 months after the wedding he said that things were 
much better. People saw what a good job he was doing providing for his wife and they 
were living a relatively good life. He had been accepted. In addition, Henri was looking 
at ways to create employment for his wife, thus taking the idea of the provider duties one 
step further. 
Providing for the family seems to mean more than just providing for the wife and 
children. The better off interlocutors where helping siblings and relatives in any way they 
saw fit. This could be with finances such as school fees, taking in a younger sibling to 
live with them or helping with employment. As previously mentioned, the CSO where I 
spent much of my time was often referred to as a ‘family’. As the year progressed it 
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became clear that this was not simply a name to describe the close relationship between 
the different staff members. Quite a lot of the staff members were indeed close family as 
the higher-level staff, all men, had helped give opportunities to relatives for some of the 
lower paying, temporary jobs. A good proportion of the projects also took place in the 
home commune of the President of the organization. No one ever spoke of these 
arrangements as a form of corruption as might be the case elsewhere. On the contrary, it 
seemed natural and expected that those men that have the means, help provide for others. 
Besides being a good provider, socializing is an important aspect of men’s lives 
in Burundi. In Burundi there are various bars and restaurants that need not be more than a 
small hut with corrugated iron roof and several white plastic chairs and tables 
surrounding it, filled with people enjoying refreshments. Although these places are far 
from being men-only zones and it is not uncomfortable or unusual for women to be part 
of the crowd, this kind of socializing is more common amongst men. Men being out too 
much was a common complaint from women.1  
Pascal explained this socializing in terms of masculinity. In a conversation that 
took place an afternoon in September 2015, masculinity was not the topic of discussion 
but, as was usual at that time, the security situation and how it was forcing people to stay 
more at home. It was somewhat surprising when he pointed out the emasculating factor 
of the self-imposed curfew or travel restrictions that were in place in Bujumbura at that 
time. ‘I don’t know how to explain this to you’ he started and after a short pause 
continued ‘but a man in Burundi cannot come home at six o’clock. He is supposed to be 
out sharing beer with friends. At six the dinner is still being prepared and the man should 
not come home until it is ready’.  
Thus, going out is not just a leisurely activity but is also significant regarding 
identity and masculinity construction, including being in the ‘correct’ space. This again 
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has financial implications since buying rounds is a common practice. The link between 
consumption and manhood has been documented elsewhere, for example in the United 
States (Holt & Thompson, 2002; Moisio, 2007), Mozambique (Groes-Green, 2009), and 
the Ivory Coast (Matlon, 2015; Newell, 2012). In these countries being the breadwinner 
is central to manhood, but difficult for many men to attain due to the lack of means, 
particularly in Mozambique and the Ivory Coast. Matlon (2011) argues that extreme 
consumerism connects marginalised men to the global economy as consumers, whilst 
remaining excluded as potential fathers and husbands.  
I argue that in Burundi however this is rather related to social relations and the 
need to connect with other people. It was not unusual that when going out for drinks it 
would simply be stated that ‘today I would like to share a beer with you’ or ‘today I 
would like to buy you a drink’. Hence the focus was often either on the sharing aspect 
(although drinks were not literally shared) or that you take turns in paying for each other, 
strengthening social bonds.  
Finally, wealth earns respect in its own right. In a conversation about domestic 
animals with Pascal, who lived in Bujumbura, he stated his wish to acquire cows and 
goats. I found this a bit odd, coming from the city dweller. The reason he gave was his 
own, and his wife’s, love of milk, ‘but also that people look at a person that has these 
animals and think wow, this is someone important.’ In line with this, he at a different 
time also stated that ‘you need money also, not just to live but to have a voice… when 
you have money you are powerful. You are considered important, someone that 
contributes to society and therefore someone to listen to.’ 
It seems that among the many competing and overlapping factors that contribute 
to the making of masculinity in Burundi, socioeconomic status is the most prominent 
one. Peter Uvin’s (2009) work on ex-combatants in Burundi portrays them as viewing the 
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ideal man as someone responsible, honest, trustworthy and wise. A man should also work 
and be the provider, a husband and a father, much as has been reported from non-ex-
combatant Burundians. According to Uvin “Burundian masculinity centers on 
responsibility”(2009, 179).  
To conclude, it seems that ex-combatants in Burundi think of masculinity in very 
much the same terms as their fellow non-ex-combatant Burundians. Marriage, being able 
to provide, and having money in general are of central importance to what it means to be 
a man in Burundi, ex-combatant or not. Militarized masculinity does not seem to be the 
dominant masculinity nor is militarized masculinity linked to aggression and violence. 
Men and women that are part of armed groups don’t completely lose touch with the 
wider society and their gender construction is likely to be based on the normative ideas 
outside the armed institutions. There is thus a co-existence and overlap of militarized 
masculinities and other versions of masculinities. It is not my intention to replace one 
neat version of masculinity (militarized) with another (breadwinner focused). It is 
important to remember the ‘messiness’ of masculinities and that one version does not 
exclude another, but that different types of masculinities can both overlap, and different 
versions be acted out depending on variable social interactions and circumstances. In 
Burundi these versions of masculinity are not polar opposites, but where they differ the 





In this article, I have focused on broadening understandings of masculinity construction 
amongst ex-combatants. Using Burundi as a case study, I have examined how ex-
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combatants conceptualize and construct their ideas of masculinity in light of their 
military or rebel experience. As my examination demonstrates, the widely held idea of 
hegemonic masculinity as that of the warrior figure cannot be sustained, at least not for 
Burundi. Normative manhood in Burundi rests heavily on marriage. That is by far the 
most dominant aspect of manhood and womanhood and it is difficult to see how 
alternative aspects could compete in a credible manner. In addition, being the provider 
and having economic capital is of central importance for masculinity construction. Many 
of my interlocutors were not of a particularly high socio-economic status and were thus 
struggling on a daily basis, not just to get by, but to adhere to the dominant masculinity. 
Many of them blamed their time in the war for the struggle they were now facing. They 
never depicted any indication of viewing the time as combatants as a time when they 
were conforming to ideas of masculinity, even though they were in a more powerful 
position at that time. Narratives produced on good soldiering also centred around 
obedience, fearlessness, and people skills, not violence or aggression. My interlocutors’ 
old combatant identity did not seem to be of importance in their masculinity construction. 
Instead many of them argued that they had wasted their time in the war. This was time 
that they could otherwise have spent on finishing or furthering their education or starting 
a career. This would have been a better path to reach a position where they would be able 
to conform to the normative masculinity.  
 These findings are not dissimilar to other research from Burundi (Uvin, 2009), the 
DRC (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2008) and Latin America (Dietrich Ortega, 2012). As well 
as the growing literature calling for deeper examinations of the construction of 
masculinities among combatants, in post-conflict settings and the link between 
masculinity and aggression and violence in general (Kirby & Henry, 2012; Myrttinen et 
al., 2017). What differentiates this research is that it not only problematizes the 
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relationship between military experience and masculinity but holds that military and 
rebel experience is seen as an obstacle to reaching manhood, therefore suggesting a 
negative relationship between military experience and masculinity. 
 Masculinity construction is context specific. The role of militarization in 
masculinity construction is perhaps not as clearly related to conflict areas or personal 
experience of serving in an armed group as has been assumed. Militarized masculinity is 
also context specific and may not necessarily be linked to violence and aggression, as has 
been portrayed. This calls for the deepening of efforts to critically examine when and 
how militarism and masculinity interlink and when they do not, or do so to a lesser 
extent. What is it that in some areas and contexts contributes to militarism becoming a 
defining aspect of society, having, among other things, decisive effects on gender 
construction and identity creation? And why is it that in other context, as in Burundi, 
where war, combat and the military may be more visible than elsewhere and have played 
a larger role in people’s lives, that militarism does not seem to have such a defining 
effect? Pursuing the answers of these questions would further benefit the understanding 
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